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Abstract—The fundamental limits of biometric identification
systems under a strong secrecy criterion are investigated. In
the previous studies of this scenario, the fundamental trade-
off among secrecy, template, privacy- and secrecy-leakages has
been revealed in the case where there is only one user, while the
case of multiple users has not been discussed yet. In this study,
we consider the system with exponentially many users, and we
characterize the capacity region of the rate tuples including the
user (identification) rate under the strong secrecy criterion. In
the achievability proof, we derive a new method to incorporate
multiple users by extending the random binning for one user’s
case. The obtained result shows that the characterization of the
capacity region does not vary regardless of the weak or strong
secrecy criterion in terms of secrecy-leakage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric identification system (BIS) indicates a system
using physical characteristics of living individual to identify
its identity from a large group of people. For example,
border control systems, medical record systems, etc, are some
familiar practical application of the BIS. As large number of
individuals are involved, the issues of privacy protection and
storage saving have been broadly discussed.
In general, from information theoretic perspectives, the stud-
ies on the BIS investigate the maximum number of individuals
and secret keys (usability) while minimizing error probability
(reliability), memory usages (storage), and information leak-
age of individuals (security). O’Sullivan and Schmid [1] and
Willems et al. [2] firstly introduced the BIS where the bio-
data sequence is stored in the plain form. Willems et al. [2]
characterized the identification capacity of the BIS. Tuncel
[3] added constraint (encoding) on the helper data, which we
call template in this paper, stored in the database and clarified
the fundamental trade-off between identification and template
rates. Some extended works considering the rate distortion can
be found in [4] and [5].
Ignatenko and Willems [6] studied the BIS with estimating
both individual’s index and secret key. In their paper, two
common BIS models: Generated Secret BIS (GS-BIS) model
and Chosen Secret BIS (CS-BIS) model were analyzed. In the
GS-BIS model, secret key is extracted from bio-data sequence,
while in the CS-BIS model the secret key is chosen indepen-
dently of it. They characterized the capacity regions of iden-
tification, secrecy, and privacy-leakage rates in both models.
Here, privacy-leakage is the amount of information leakage
between bio-data sequence and its corresponding template.
Another security measurement in the BIS is secrecy-leakage,
which represents the leaked information through secret key
and template generated by the same bio-data sequence. A GS-
BIS model without privacy-leakage by associating a private
key was studied in [7]. Instead of evaluating the privacy-
leakage, the GS-BIS model considering the template rate can
be found in [8]. Furthermore, the GS-BIS model with the
presence of an adversary at the decoder was discussed in
[9]. Recently, Yachongka and Yagi characterized the capacity
regions of more general models in [10] for the GS-BIS model
and in [11] for the CS-BIS model via two auxiliary RVs.
Compared to the models proposed in [6]–[9], they treated a
noisy enrollment channel (hidden source model). However, all
the studies mentioned above [6]–[11] measured the secrecy-
leakage of individual under the weak secrecy criterion.
Another stream of studies like [12]–[18] copes with only
the estimation of one individual’s secret key. More specifically,
the studies in [12] and [13] investigated the fundamental trade-
off of secrecy and privacy-leakage. The fundamental limits of
secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates are argued in [15]
for non-perfect secrecy-leakage and in [14] for perfect secrecy-
leakage under the weak secrecy criterion. Studies on the BIS
considering secrecy-leakage under the strong secrecy criterion
can be found in [16] for a hidden source model, in [17] for
broadcast channel measurements, and in [18] for a multi-
access system. However, the BIS with multiple users under
the strong secrecy criterion have not yet been considered.
In this study, we aim to characterize the capacity region
of the models proposed in [10] and [11] under the strong
secrecy criterion. In the achievability proof, we deployed the
techniques developed by Yassaee et. al. [19] to verify that the
total variation between the joint distribution of secret key and
template assigned by random binning is exponentially close
to their uniform distributions. This technique is also used in
the proof of [16] and [17] for the case of one individual,
and we extend it to the case of exponentially many users.
Compared to the analyses in [16] and [17], the challenges are
the analyses of error probability and privacy-leakage rate. We
find out that it is required the sum of template and common
randomness rates to be larger than the condition shown in
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Fig. 1. The GS-BIS model Fig. 2. The CS-BIS model
these studies in order to ensure that both index and secret key
of the identified individual are reliably estimated. For dealing
with the difficulties of the privacy-leakage rate, we introduce
a virtual decoder for deriving the bound in the achievability
proof, whose functions will be made clear later on. As a result,
It is shown that the characterizations of the capacity regions do
not change regardless of the weak or strong secrecy criterion
in respect of secrecy-leakage.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define notation used in this paper and
introduce the GS-BIS and CS-BIS models.
A. Notation
Upper-case such that A denotes a random variable (RV)
taking values in A and lower-case a ∈ A denotes its realiza-
tion. Calligraphic letter A stands for a finite set and its size
is written as |A|. Superscripts represent a string of RVs, e.g.
An = (A1, · · · , An), taking values in An, and subscripts rep-
resent the position of a RV in the string. PA(a) = Pr[A = a],
a ∈ A, represents the probability distribution on A and PUA
denotes the uniform distribution on the set A. PAn represents
the probability distribution of RV An ∈ An. PAnBn represents
the joint probability distribution of a pair of RVs (An, Bn) and
its conditional probability distribution PAn|Bn is defined as
PAn|Bn(an|bn) = PA
nBn(a
n, bn)
PBn(bn)
(1)
for any an ∈ An, bn ∈ Bn such that PBn(bn) > 0. The total
variation between two probability mass functions PA and QA
on the same alphabet A is defined as
V(PA, QA) =
1
2
∑
a∈A
|PA(a)−QA(a)|. (2)
Throughout this paper, logarithms are of base two. Integers x
and y such that x < y, [x, y] denotes the set {x, x+1, · · · , y}.
A partial sequence of a sequence cn from the first symbol
to the tth symbol (c1, · · · , ct) is represented by ct. A(n) (X)
denotes the strongly typical set (cf. [20], [21]).
B. System Models
The GS-BIS and CS-BIS models considered in this paper
are depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, respectively. Let I = [1,MI ]
be the set of indices of individuals. For any i ∈ I, we
assume that Xni (bio-data sequence of individual i) with
realizations on Xn is generated independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) from a discrete memoryless source PX ,
PY |X , and PZ|X are memoryless channels at the encoder and
decoder, observing Y ni with realizations on Yn and Zn with
realizations on Zn, respectively, when Xni is input. Thus, the
joint distribution is given by
PY ni Xni Zn(y
n
i , x
n
i , z
n)
= PY ni |Xni (y
n
i |xni )PXni (xni )PZn|Xni (zn|xni )
=
∏n
i=k
PY |X(yik|xik)PX(xik)PZ|X(zk|xik) (3)
In the GS-BIS model, upon observing Y ni , the encoder f
generates a secret key S(i) ∈ S and template J(i) ∈ J as
(S(i), J(i)) = f(Y ni ), where S = [1,MS ] and J = [1,MJ ]
are sets of secret key and templates. J(i) is stored at position
i in the system database and S(i) is handed back to the
individual i. The decoder g sees Zn and estimates the pair
of index and secret key by
(Ŵ , Ŝ(w)) = g(Zn,JMI ), (4)
where JMI denotes the set of templates (the database)
{J(1), · · · , J(MI)}.
Next, we define J ′(i) and S′(i) as the template and se-
cret key of individual i for the CS-BIS model. In the CS-
BIS model, S′(i) is chosen independently of other RVs,
e.g., Y ni , X
n
i , Z
n, and the encoder generates the template as
J ′(i) = f(Y ni , S
′(i)) for every individual. After receiving Zn,
the decoder uses Zn and all templates stored in the database
to reveal the identified individual’s index and secret key as
(Ŵ , Ŝ′(w)) = g(Zn,J ′MI ), (5)
where J ′MI = {J ′(1), · · · , J ′(MI)}.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS AND MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state the definitions and main results
about the GS-BIS and CS-BIS models.
Definition 1. (Achievability for GS-BIS model)
A tuple of an identification, secrecy, template, and privacy-
leakage rates (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is said to be achievable for
the GS-BIS model if for any δ > 0 and large enough n there
exist pairs of encoders and decoders that satisfy
max
i∈I
Pr{(Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i} ≤ δ, (6)
1
n
logMI ≥ RI − δ, (7)
1
n
logMJ ≤ RJ + δ, (8)
min
i∈I
1
n
H(S(i)) ≥ RS − δ, (9)
max
i∈I
1
n
I(Xni ; J(i)) ≤ RL + δ, (10)
max
i∈I
I(S(i); J(i)) ≤ δ. (11)
In the previous studies on the GS-BIS model, the secrecy-
leakage were measured by maxi∈I 1nI(S(i); J(i)) ≤ δ, e.g.
[6], [7], [9], and [11]. This constraint is generally called weak
secrecy. Compared to the weak secrecy criterion, the condition
(11) is more rigorous since it is required that the quantity of
secrecy-leakage for every individual i must not increase in
accordance with the block length n (arbitrarily small constant).
The condition (11) is known as strong secrecy.
Remark 1. In [6] and [7], for bounding the sum rate of iden-
tification and secret key rates in the proof of converse part, a
stronger requirement that the distribution of secret key of every
individual must be almost uniform, i.e. mini∈I 1nH(S(i)) +
δ ≥ 1n logMS , is included in (9). However, this requirement
was not necessary in the general problem formulation of the
GS-BIS model.
Definition 2. (Achievability for CS-BIS model)
A tuple (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is said to be achievable for the
CS-BIS model if there exist pairs of encoders and decoders
that satisfy all the requirements in Definition 1 for any δ > 0
and large enough n by replacing S(i) and J(i) with S′(i) and
J ′(i).
Definition 3. RG and RC are defined as the closure of the
set of all achievable rate tuples for the GS-BIS and CS-BIS
models, respectively, called the capacity regions.
Remark 2. Note that all individuals are encoded by the same
encoding function f(·). Another possible system is that each
individual is encoded by a different encoding function, i.e.,
the encoder has a set of encoding functions {fi(·)}MIi=1 for
enrollment and those functions are shared between the encoder
and decoder. However, either system model corresponds to the
equivalent characterization of the capacity region.
Theorem 1. The capacity region for the GS-BIS is given by
RG = {(RI ,RS , RJ , RL) :
RI +RS ≤ I(Z;U),
RJ ≥ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) +RI ,
RL ≥ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) +RI ,
RI ≥ 0, RS ≥ 0
for some U s.t. Z −X − Y − U}, (12)
where auxiliary RV U takes values in a finite alphabet U with
|U| ≤ |Y|+ 2.
Theorem 2. The capacity region for the CS-BIS is given by
RC = {(RI ,RS , RJ , RL) :
RI +RS ≤ I(Z;U),
RJ ≥ I(Y ;U),
RL ≥ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) +RI ,
RI ≥ 0, RS ≥ 0
for some U s.t. Z −X − Y − U}, (13)
where U satisfies the same conditions as in Theorem 1.
The characterizations of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are
identical to the results given in [10, Theorem 1] and in [11,
Theorem 1] under the weak secrecy criterion, respectively.
This indicates the capacity regions under weak or strong
secrecy is characterized in the same form. Furthermore, the
correspondence to the one given in [16, Theorem 5] can be
confirmed by setting RI = 0.
Remark 3. The observations given in [14, Theorem 2] and
[22, Theorem 2] for the case of single and multiple users,
respectively, indicate that RG is clearly wider than RC , which
is due to the range of RJ . A remark given in [8] implied that
in case where the enrollment channel is noiseless (X = Y ),
the fundamental limit of RL and RJ is identical for the GS-
BIS model under the weak secrecy criterion. The claim also
holds for the GS-BIS model under the strong secrecy criterion.
However, this claim can not be applied to the CS-BIS model.
In the following section, we highlight only some key points
regarding the proof Theorem 1. Indeed, the proof of Theorem
2 (CS-BIS model) is based on the arguments of Theorem 1.
The additional task is to use the secret key generated from the
GS-BIS encoder to mask the chosen secret key of the CS-BIS
model by implementing a one-time pad operation as shown in
Fig. 3. For details, readers should refer to [6], [10], and [14]
for example to see how the arguments for the GS-BIS model
is applied to the CS-BIS model.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Achievability (Direct Part)
First, fix δ > 0 and the length of codeword n. We choose
a test channel PU |Y and set 0 < RI < I(U ;Z), RS =
I(Z;U)−RI − δ,RJ = I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)+RI +2δ,RL =
I(X;U) − I(Z;U) + RI + 2δ, and RC = H(U |Y ) − 2δ.
Fig. 3. Encoder and decoder of the CS-BIS model
Also, we set MI = 2nRI , MS = 2nRS , MJ = 2nRJ , and
MC = 2
nRC . Here, RC and MC denote the rate and size of
common randomness.
Binning: For each sequence un ∈ An (U), draw a index tuple
(s, j, c) uniformly at random from [1,MS ]×[1,MJ ]×[1,MC ],
where s, j, and c represent the secret key, template, and
common randomness, respectively. The sequences with the
same indexes of template j and common randomness c form a
bin B(j, c). The index assignments define a mapping function
e : Uk −→ [1,MS ]× [1,MJ ]× [1,MC ], which is revealed to
the encoder and the decoder.
This is random binning with common randomness, where
the index of common randomness c is fixed and shared by the
encoder and the decoder.
Encoding (Enrollment): Given an observation yni and c, the
encoder looks for un in the bin B(j, c) such that (yni , un) ∈
An (Y U). It determines (s(i), j(i)) obtains based on u
n, i.e.
(s(i), j(i), c) = e(un). j(i) is stored at the position i in the
database and s(i) is handed back to the individual. If there
are several such un, it picks one of them at random. In case,
there is no such un, it randomly selects a sequence from the
bin B(1, 1, c).
Decoding (Identification): Observing zn (the noisy sequence
of xnw) and the database JMI , it looks for un ∈ B(j(i), c)
such that (zn, un) ∈ An (ZU) for some i. If there is a unique
pair i and un, the decoder outputs ŵ = i and ŝ(w) = s as
the corresponding secret key of the unique un, i.e., e(un) =
(s, j(i), c). Otherwise, it declares error.
Analysis of Error Probability: We bound the probability of
error averaged over bin assignments. Let C be the RV of
common randomness. Let S(i) and J(i) denote the random
indices for Uni chosen by the encoder based on Y
n
i for given
C. Notice that Uni ∈ B(J(i), C). For W = i, the error event
at encoder is
1) E1 : (Y ni , Uni ) /∈ An (Y U)
and the events at the decoder are
2) E2 : (Zn, Uni ) /∈ An (ZU),
3) E3: ∃i′ 6= i such that u˜n ∈ B(J(i′), C) and (Zn, u˜n) ∈
An (ZU) for some u˜
n,
4) E4: u˜n ∈ B(J(i), C) and (Zn, u˜n) ∈ An (ZU) for some
u˜n 6= Uni .
Thus, we have
Pr{(Ŵ ,Ŝ(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i}
= Pr
{ 4⋃
i=1
Ei|W = i
}
≤
4∑
i=1
Pr{Ei|W = i} (14)
Pr[E1|W = i] goes to zero as n trends to infinity because
the sum rate of RJ +RS > I(Y ;U) and Pr[E2|W = i] goes
to zero by the law of large numbers. For Pr[E3|W = i], it
can be evaluated as follows. Here, we newly define the event
E3(i′) : u˜n ∈ B(J(i′), C) and (Zn, u˜n) ∈ An (ZU) for some
u˜n. Then,
Pr[E3|W = i]
= Pr
{ ⋃
i′ 6=i
E3(i′)|W = i
}
≤MI Pr{E3(1)|W = i}
=MI
∑
zn
PZn(z
n)
· Pr{u˜n ∈ B(J(1), C) for some u˜n,
(zn, u˜n) ∈ An (ZU)|Zn = zn}
=MI
∑
zn
PZn(z
n)
·
∑
u˜n∈An (U |zn)
Pr{u˜n ∈ B(J(1), C)|Zn = zn}
(a)
= MI · |An (U |zn)| · Pr{u˜n ∈ B(J(1), C)}
≤ 2n(RI+H(U |Z)+δ) · 2−n(RJ+RC) (15)
for large enough n, where (a) follows because the events
{u˜n ∈ B(J(i), C)} and {Zn = zn} are mutually independent.
Since RJ +RC > H(U |Z)+RI , Pr[E3|W = i] can be made
arbitrarily small. By using [19, Lemma 1], Pr[E4|W = i] goes
to zero as well because RJ + RC > H(U |Z). Therefore, it
can be made that
Pr{(Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i} ≤ 4δ (16)
for all sufficiently large n.
Next, we check the bounds of identification, secrecy, tem-
plate, secrecy-leakage and privacy-leakage rates averaged over
randomly chosen bin assignments En, which is an RV corre-
sponding to e.
Intermediate Step:
We consider a system with a virtual decoder gi for deriving
the upper bound on the privacy-leakage rate. In this system,
knowing index i (leads to obtain J(i)) and seeing Zni (defined
as the output sequence of Xni via PZ|X ), the virtual decoder gi
estimates Uˆni as Uˆ
n
i = gi(Z
n
i , J(i), C). Note that this system
is just for analysis, and the virtual decoder is not actually used
during the decoding process.
For any given i ∈ I, gi operates as follows: observing zni ,
j(i) and c, it looks for un such that (zni , u
n) ∈ A(n) (ZU)
and un ∈ B(j(i), c). If there are multiple such un, it declares
error. The potential events of error probability for this case
are E1, E2, and E4. Letting Pe(i) be the error probability of
gi, we readily see that
Pe(i) ≤ Pr{(Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))|W = i} ≤ 4δ, (17)
where the middle term in (17) denotes the error probability of
g (the real decoder) for individual W = i.
The function of this virtual decoder enables us to bound the
following conditional entropy
H(Uni |Zni , J(i), C,En)
(b)
≤ H(Uni |Uˆni )
(c)
≤ nδn, (18)
where
(b) follows because Uˆni is a function of Z
n
i and J(i) given
C and conditioning reduces entropy,
(c) follows because Fano’s inequality and (17) are applied,
and we set δn = 1n (1 + 4nδ log |U|).
Lemma 1. For any fixed δ > 0, it holds that
1
n
H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , C,En) ≤ H(Y |X,U) + δ (19)
for all large enough n.
(Proof) The proof is given in Appendix A-A.
Lemma 2. It holds that
1
n
I(Xni ;C|En) ≤ δ′n, (20)
1
n
I(Y ni ;C|Xni , En) ≤ δ′n, (21)
where δ′n is some positive number satisfying δ
′
n ↓ 0 as n→∞.
(Proof) The proofs are given in Appendix A-B.
Analyses of Identification and Template Rates:
Equations (7) and (8) follow obviously from the parameter
settings.
Analyses of Secrecy Rate and Secrecy-Leakage:
By invoking [19, Theorem 1] and [23, Lemma 1] (al-
ternative proof), it can be proved that the total variation
V(PS(i),J(i),C , PUS(i)P
U
J(i)P
U
C ) converges to zero exponentially
with n for RS +RJ +RC < H(U). This implies that (9) and
(11) in Definition 1 hold.
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage:
We start by expanding the following mutual information as
I(Xni ; J(i), C|En)
= I(Xni ;C|En) + I(Xni ; J(i)|C,En)
(d)
≤ I(Xni ; J(i)|C,En) + nδ′n
= H(J(i)|C,En)−H(J(i)|Xni , C,En) + nδ′n
≤ H(J(i))−H(J(i)|Xni , C,En) + nδ′n
= H(J(i))−H(Y ni , J(i)|Xni , C,En)
+H(Y ni |Xni , J(i), C,En) + nδ′n
(e)
= H(J(i))−H(Y ni |Xni , C,En)
+H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , J(i), C,En)
+ I(Y ni ;U
n
i |Xni , J(i), C,En) + nδ′n
(f)
≤ H(J(i))−H(Y ni |Xni , En) + I(Y ni ;C|Xni , En)
+H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , C,En) +H(Uni |Xni , J(i), C,En) + nδ′n
(g)
≤ H(J(i))− nH(Y |X) + I(Y ni ;C|Xni , En)
+ n(H(Y |X,U) + δ) +H(Uni |Xni , J(i), C,En) + nδ′n
(h)
≤ H(J(i))− nH(Y |X) + nH(Y |X,U)
+H(Uni |Zni , Xni , J(i), C,En) + n(δ + 2δ′n)
(i)
≤ H(J(i))− nH(Y |X) + nH(Y |X,U)
+H(Uni |Zni , J(i), C,En) + n(δ + 2δ′n)
(j)
≤ n(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) +RI + 2δ)
− nI(Y ;U |X) + n(δ + δn + 2δ′n)
(k)
= n(I(X;U)− I(Z;U) +RI + 3δ + δn + 2δ′n), (22)
where
(d) follows due to (20) in Lemma 2,
(e) holds because J(i) is a function of (Y ni , C,En),
(f) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(g) holds due to Lemma 1,
(h) follows because (21) in Lemma 2 is used and Uni −
(J(i), C,Xni )− Zni form a Markov chain,
(i) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(j) follows because H(J(i)) ≤ nRJ and (18) is applied,
(k) holds because I(Y ;U |X) = H(U |X) − H(U |Y ) =
I(Y ;U)− I(X;U).
Thus, from (22), we have
1
n
I(Xni ; J(i)|C,En) ≤ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) +RI + 3δ
= RL + δ (23)
for large enough n.
Lastly, by applying the selection lemma [24, Lemma 2.2],
there exists a good instance of binning e and common ran-
domness c satisfying all conditions in Definition 1 for large
enough n.
B. Converse Part
Notice that the capacity region under the strong secrecy
criterion is contained in the one under the weak secrecy
criterion. It has been shown in [22] that the capacity region
of the GS-BIS model under the weak secrecy criterion is
contained in the right-hand side of (13). Here, we write the
detailed proof of converse part of the GS-BIS model under the
weak secrecy criterion for reader’s sake.
A more relaxed case where W is uniform is considered and
the condition (6) in Definition 1 is replaced with the average
error criterion Pr{(Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) 6= (W,S(W ))} ≤ δ.
We assume that a rate tuple (RI , RS , RJ , RL) is achievable.
Here, we provide useful lemmas. For t ∈ [1, n], we define
an auxiliary RV Ut = (Zt−1, J(W ), S(W )). We denote
strings of RVs by XnW = (X1(W ), · · · , Xn(W )) and Y nW =
(Y1(W ), · · · , Yn(W )).
Lemma 3. The following Markov chains hold
Zt−1 − (Y t−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))− Yt(W ), (24)
Zt−1 − (Xt−1(W ), J(W ), S(W ))−Xt(W ). (25)
(Proof) The proofs are given in [10, Appendix C-A].
Lemma 4. There exists an RV U satisfying Z −X − Y − U
and
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut) = nI(Z;U), (26)
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Ut) = nI(Y ;U), (27)
n∑
t=1
I(Xt(W );Ut) = nI(X;U). (28)
(Proof) The proof is provided in [10, Appendix B].
Analysis of the Sum of Identification and Secrecy Rates:
We can show that
RI +RS ≤ I(Z;U) + 3δ + 2δn, (29)
where δn = 1n (1 + logMIMS) and δn ↓ 0 as n→∞.
(Proof) The proof is provided in Appendix B-A.
Analysis of Template Rate:
It is shown that
RJ ≥ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) +RI − (2δ + δn). (30)
(Proof) The proof is provided in Appendix B-B.
Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate:
The privacy-leakage rate can be bounded as
RL ≥ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) +RI − (2δ + δn). (31)
(Proof) The proof is provided in Appendix B-C.
Finally, by letting n → ∞ and δ ↓ 0, it follows that the
capacity region of the GS-BIS model is contained in the right-
hand side of (12) from (29)–(31).
To complete the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we
discuss the bounds on the cardinality of auxiliary RV U . For
proving the bound on the cardinality of alphabet U in the
region RG (cf. (12)) and RC (cf. (13)), we use the support
lemma in [21, Appendix C] to show that the auxiliary RV U
should have |Y| − 1 elements to preserve PY and add three
more elements to preserve H(Z|U), H(Y |U), and H(X|U).
This implies that it suffices to take |U| ≤ |Y|+2 for preserving
both RG and RC .
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, the fundamental limits of BIS with expo-
nentially many users under a strong secrecy criterion were
analyzed. We characterized the capacity regions of identifi-
cation, secrecy, template, and privacy-leakage rates in both
the GS-BIS and CS-BIS models under the strong secrecy
criterion in regard to secrecy-leakage. The method developed
in [16] for characterizing the capacity region of the BIS where
there exists only a single user is extended to deal with the
one with multiple users. As a result, it was shown that the
characterizations of the capacity regions remain the same even
the security criterion of secrecy-leakage is shifted from weak
to strong secrecy. For future work, we plan to clarify the
fundamental limits of the BIS with the presence of adversary
at the decoder.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY PROOFS FOR DIRECT PART
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We define a new random variable T as follows:
T =
{
1 if (Y ni , X
n
i , U
n
i ) ∈ An (Y XU),
0 otherwise.
(32)
Notice that it has been shown that PT (0) or the probability
which (Y ni , X
n
i , U
n
i ) are not jointly typical is smaller than 4δ
for large enough n in the analysis of error probability.
We begin with expanding the entropy in the left-hand side
of (19) as
H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , C,En)
≤ H(Y ni , T |Xni , Uni , C,En)
= H(T |Xni , Uni , C,En) +H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , C,En, T )
≤ H(T ) +H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , C,En, T )
≤ H(T ) +H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , T )
= H(T ) + PT (0)H(Y
n
i |Xni , Uni , T = 0)
+ PT (1)H(Y
n
i |Xni , Uni , T = 1)
≤ 1 + nPT (0)H(Y ) +H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , T = 1)
≤ 1 + 4nδ log |Y|+H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , T = 1)
= 1 + 4nδ log |Y|+
∑
(xni ,u
n
i )∈An (XU)
{
PXni Uni |T (x
n
i , u
n
i |1)
·H(Y ni |Xni = xni , Uni = uni , T = 1)
}
(a)
≤ 1 + 4nδ log |Y|+
∑
(xni ,u
n
i )∈An (XU)
{
PXni Uni |T (x
n
i , u
n
i |1)
· log |An (Y |xni , uni )|
}
(b)
≤ 1 + 4nδ log |Y|+
∑
(xni ,u
n
i )∈An (XU)
{
PXni Uni |T (x
n
i , u
n
i |1)
· (n(H(Y |X,U) + δ())
}
≤ n
(
H(Y |X,U) + δ() + 4δ log |Y|+ 1
n
)
(33)
where
(a) follows because the conditional entropy achieves the
maximum when PY ni |Xni ,Uni ,T is uniform over the typical
set An (Y |xni , uni ),
(b) follows by the typical average lemma [21] and δ() =
H(Y |X,U) with small enough positive .
Thus,
1
n
H(Y ni |Xni , Uni , C,En) ≤ H(Y |X,U) + δ (34)
for large enough n.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Equations (20) and (21) can be proved by similar arguments
since we have RC < H(U |Y ) ≤ H(U |X). Here, we provide
the detailed proof of (21) alone.
Let h(a) = a log 1a + (1 − a) log 1(1−a) denote the binary
entropy for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and h(0) = h(1) = 0. Since
we set RC < H(U |Y ), by applying [19, theorem 1], it
guarantees that the upper bound of the total variation between
PCY ni |En and PC|EnPY ni |En is exponentially decaying with n,
i.e, V(PCY ni |En , PC|EnPY ni |En) = V(PC|Y ni ,En , PC|En) ≤ γ
where γ is some small enough positive.
From the left-hand side of (21), we have
I(Y ni ;C|Xni , En) (c)
= H(C|Xni , En)−H(C|Xni , Y ni , En)
(a)
= H(C|Xni , En)−H(C|Y ni , En)
(b)
≤ H(C)−H(C|Y ni , En)
(c)
≤ H(C)−
(
H(C)−
(
h(
γ
2
) +
γ
2
log(MC − 1)
))
= h(
γ
2
) +
γ
2
log(MC − 1) (35)
where
(a) follows because C − Y ni −Xni holds for given En,
(b) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(c) follows because [25, Theorem 6] is applied.
Hence,
1
n
I(Y ni ;C|Xni , En) ≤ δ′, (36)
where δ′ = 1n
(
h(γ2 ) +
γ
2 log(MC − 1)
)
.
APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY PROOFS FOR CONVERSE PART
A. Analysis of the Sum of Identification and Secrecy Rates
We show that the claim of Remark 1 can be checked below.
Again note that we are considering the case where W is
uniformly distributed in this part. First, we start by evaluating
the identification rate
logMI = H(W )
= H(W |JMI , Zn) + I(W ;JMI , Zn)
(a)
= H(W |JMI , Zn, Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) + I(W ;JMI , Zn)
(b)
≤ H(W |Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) + I(W ;JMI , Zn)
≤ H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) + I(W ;JMI , Zn)
(c)
≤ nδn + I(W ;JMI ) + I(W ;Zn|JMI )
(d)
= nδn + I(W ;Z
n|JMI )
= nδn +H(Z
n|JMI )−H(Zn|JMI ,W )
(e)
= nδn +H(Z
n|J(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ),W )
≤ nδn +H(Zn)−H(Zn|J(W ),W )
= nδn +H(Z
n)−H(Zn|J(W )), (37)
where
(a) follows because the pair (Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) is a function of
(Zn,JMI ) (cf. (5)),
(b) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(c) follows due to Fano’s inequality and δn = 1n (1 +
logMIMS) and δn ↓ 0 as n→∞,
(d) follows because W is independent of other RVs,
(e) follows because only J(W ) is possibly dependent on Zn
due to statistical independent among bio-data sequences.
Next, we consider the entropy of secrecy key as
H(S(W )) = H(S(W )|JMI , Zn) + I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
(f)
= H(S(W )|JMI , Zn, Ŵ , Ŝ(W ))
+ I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
(g)
≤ H(S(W )|Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) + I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
≤ H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , Ŝ(W )) + I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
(h)
≤ nδn + I(S(W );JMI , Zn)
= nδn + I(S(W );JMI ) + I(S(W );Zn|JMI )
(i)
= nδn + I(S(W ); J(W )) + I(S(W );Z
n|J(W ))
(j)
≤ I(S(W );Zn|J(W )) + n(δn + δ)
≤ H(Zn|J(W ))−H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ))
+ n(δn + δ), (38)
where
(f) holds because Ŝ(W ) is a function of (JMI , Zn),
(g) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(h) follows due to Fano’s inequality,
(i) holds because only Zn, S(W ), and J(W ) are possibly
dependent on each other,
(j) follows due to (11).
Combining (37) and (38), and from (7) and (9), we obtain
RI +RS
(k)
≤ 1
n
{H(Zn)−H(Zn|J(W ), S(W ))}+ 3δ + 2δn
=
1
n
I(Zn; J(W ), S(W )) + 3δ + 2δn
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Z
t−1, J(W ), S(W )) + 3δ + 2δn
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut) + 3δ + 2δn
(l)
= I(Z;U) + 3δ + 2δn, (39)
where
(k) holds because 1nH(S(W )) ≥ minw∈I 1nH(S(w)),
(l) is due to (26) in Lemma 4.
B. Analysis of Template Rate
The template rate can be evaluated as follows:
n(RJ + δ) ≥ logMJ ≥ H(J(W ))
= I(Y nW ; J(W )|W ) = I(Y nW ;JMI |W )
= I(Y nW ,W ;JMI )− I(W ;JMI )
(a)
= I(Y nW ,W ;JMI )
= I(Y nW ,W, S(W );JMI )− I(S(W );JMI |Y nW ,W )
≥ H(Y nW ,W, S(W ))−H(Y nW ,W, S(W )|JMI )
−H(S(W )|Y nW ),
(b)
= H(W ) +H(Y nW |W ) +H(S(W )|Y nW ,W )
−H(Y nW ,W, S(W )|JMI ),
= H(W ) +H(Y nW )−H(Y nW ,W, S(W )|JMI ), (40)
where
(a) follows because W is independent of other RVs,
(b) holds because S(W ) is a function of Y nW .
For the third term in (44), it can be evaluated further as
H(Y nW ,W, S(W )|JMI )
= H(Y nW |W,S(W ),JMI ) +H(W,S(W )|JMI )
= H(Y nW |S(W ), J(W )) + I(Zn;W,S(W )|JMI )
+H(W,S(W )|JMI , Zn)
(c)
≤ H(Y nW |S(W ), J(W )) +H(Zn)−H(Zn|S(W ), J(W ))
+H(W,S(W )|JMI , Zn, Ŵ , Ŝ(W ))
(d)
≤ H(Y nW |S(W ), J(W )) +H(Zn)
−H(Zn|S(W ), J(W )) +H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , Ŝ(W ))
(e)
≤ H(Y nW |S(W ), J(W )) +H(Zn)
−H(Zn|S(W ), J(W )) + nδn, (41)
where
(c) follows because conditioning reduces entropy and (5) is
taken into account,
(d) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(e) follows because Fano’s inequality.
Substituting (45) into (44), we obtain
n(RJ + δ)
≥ H(W ) +H(Y nW )−H(Y nW |S(W ), J(W ))
−H(Zn) +H(Zn|S(W ), J(W ))− nδn
= logMI
+
n∑
t=1
{
H(Yt(W ))−H(Yt(W )|Y t−1(W ), S(W ), J(W ))
}
−
n∑
t=1
{
H(Zt)−H(Zt|Zt−1, S(W ), J(W ))
}
− nδn
(f)
= logMI +
n∑
t=1
{
H(Yt(W ))
−H(Yt(W )|Zt−1, Y t−1(W ), S(W ), J(W ))
}
−
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut)− nδn
(g)
≥ logMI +
n∑
t=1
{
H(Yt(W ))
−H(Yt(W )|Zt−1, S(W ), J(W ))
}
−
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut)− nδn
= logMI +
n∑
t=1
I(Yt(W );Ut)−
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut)− nδn
(h)
= nI(Y ;U)− nI(Z;U) + logMI − nδn
(i)
≥ nI(Y ;U)− nI(Z;U) + nRI − n(δ + δn), (42)
where
(g) holds due to (24) in Lemma 3,
(h) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(i) holds due to (26) and (27) in Lemma 4,
(j) follows due to (7).
Thus,
RJ ≥ I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U) +RI − 2δ − δn. (43)
C. Analysis of Privacy-Leakage Rate
The entire flow is similar to the arguments seen in the
previous appendix. However, we need to pay a little bit
more attention during the development of formulas since
(J(W ), S(W )) is not a function of XnW as the analysis of
template rate. From (10), we have
n(RL + δ) ≥ max
i∈I
I(Xni ; J(i)) ≥
1
MI
MI∑
i=1
I(Xni ; J(i))
= I(XnW ; J(W )|W ) = I(XnW ;JMI |W )
= I(XnW ,W ;JMI )− I(W ;JMI )
= I(XnW ,W ;JMI )
= I(XnW ,W, S(W );JMI )− I(S(W );JMI |XnW ,W )
≥ H(XnW ,W, S(W ))−H(XnW ,W, S(W )|JMI )
−H(S(W )|XnW ),
(a)
= H(W ) +H(XnW , S(W ))
−H(XnW ,W, S(W )|JMI )−H(S(W )|XnW ),
= H(W ) +H(XnW ) +H(S(W )|XnW )
−H(XnW ,W, S(W )|JMI )−H(S(W )|XnW ),
(b)
= H(W ) +H(XnW )−H(XnW ,W, S(W )|JMI ), (44)
where
(a) holds because W is independent of other RVs,
(b) holds because the third and last term in the previous step
cancel out each other.
The third term in (44) can be further bounded as
H(XnW ,W, S(W )|JMI )
= H(XnW |W,S(W ),JMI ) +H(W,S(W )|JMI )
= H(XnW |S(W ), J(W )) + I(Zn;W,S(W )|JMI )
+H(W,S(W )|JMI , Zn)
(c)
≤ H(XnW |S(W ), J(W )) +H(Zn)−H(Zn|S(W ), J(W ))
+H(W,S(W )|JMI , Zn, Ŵ , Ŝ(W ))
(d)
≤ H(XnW |S(W ), J(W )) +H(Zn)
−H(Zn|S(W ), J(W )) +H(W,S(W )|Ŵ , Ŝ(W ))
(e)
≤ H(XnW |S(W ), J(W )) +H(Zn)
−H(Zn|S(W ), J(W )) + nδn, (45)
where
(c) follows because conditioning reduces entropy and (5) is
applied,
(d) follows because conditioning reduces entropy,
(e) follows because Fano’s inequality.
Replacing (45) into (44), we obtain
n(RL + δ)
≥ H(W ) +H(XnW )−H(XnW |S(W ), J(W ))
−H(Zn) +H(Zn|S(W ), J(W ))− nδn
(f)
≥ logMI +
n∑
t=1
I(Xt(W );Ut)−
n∑
t=1
I(Zt;Ut)− nδn
(g)
= nI(X;U)− nI(Z;U) + logMI − nδn
(h)
≥ nI(X;U)− nI(Z;U) + nRI − n(δ + δn), (46)
where
(f) follows because (25) in Lemma 3 is applied,
(g) holds due to (26) and (28) in Lemma 4,
(h) follows due to (7).
Thus,
RL ≥ I(X;U)− I(Z;U) +RI − 2δ − δn. (47)
